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Shell Nigeria’s Global Memorandum of Understanding and corporate-community 
accountability relations: A critical appraisal 
 
Abstract 
Purpose: This study seeks to examine whether Shell Nigeria’s Global Memorandum of 
Understanding (GMoU) promotes corporate-community accountability as a basis for 
fostering sustainable community development in the Niger Delta.   
 
Design/methodology/approach: Shell Nigeria’s GMoU stand-alone reports were analysed 
through the lenses of accountability and transparency theoretical frameworks to explore the 
extent to which GMoU, as a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) initiative, is dialogically 
embedded and practised. Meaning-oriented content analysis was deductively used to isolate 
pertinent themes and generate findings from the background theoretical literature.  
 
Findings: We find that Shell discursively appropriates the meaning of accountability and 
transparency in a manner that allows it to maintain its social legitimacy and the asymmetric 
power relations between itself and host communities whilst restricting communities’ agency 
to hold it accountable. Shell does this by interpreting the notion of participation restrictively, 
selectively deploying the concept of transparency and accountability, and subtly exerting 
excessive control over the GMoU. Thus, the GMoU’s potential to contribute to sustainable 
community development and positive corporate-community relation is unlikely tenable. 
 
Originality/value: Accountability and transparency are core and critical to corporate-
community relations and for achieving community development CSR objectives, but are 
often taken for granted or ignored in the CSR literature on the Niger Delta of Nigeria. This 
paper addresses this gap in the literature by using accountability and transparency lenses to 
unpick GMoU model and contribute to studies on CSR practices by oil MNCs in developing 
countries. Indeed, the use of these lenses to explore CSR process offers new insights as to 
why CSR practices have failed to contribute to sustainable community development despite 
increased community spending by oil MNCs.  
 
 
Keywords:  CSR/GMoU, corporate-community relations, accountability/transparency, Shell, 
engagement/dialogue, Niger Delta communities. 
 
1. Introduction  
Corporations possess power to influence the social space (Davis, 1960). This has in 
part increased demand for accountability and social responsibility, especially in developing 
economies (Belal et al., 2013; Gray, 2006). It resonates with Davis (1960, 1967) and Gray 
(2000) who argue that the responsibility of a business should be commensurate with its power 
and so business should be held to account accordingly. In relation to this power-responsibility 
argument, there have been normative debates in the past four decades or so on whether the 
social responsibility of business is to meet the objective of profit maximization for capital 
providers (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2002), or to address society’s expectations (Dowling and 
Pfeffer, 1975) and the needs of multi-stakeholders (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Freeman, 
1984).  
These debates have been articulated around the concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) which has evolved into different areas of interests (Reich, 2008). 
According to the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, CSR “is the 
continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to economic 
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development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as 
of the local community and society at large” (WBCSD, 1999, p. 3). Several corporations 
around the world (especially multinational corporations [MNCs]) have embraced CSR 
practices to varying degrees, whether instrumentally to secure social licence to operate (SLO) 
or as a strategic business practice (Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2014a, 2014b; Slack, 2012). For 
example, as part of the business-case for CSR, corporations find incentives to engage in 
stakeholder management. One of the approaches or instruments corporations use to manage 
their stakeholders, especially their host communities, is the memorandum of understanding 
(MoU). Corporations in the extractive industries heavily use MoUs as an instrument to 
maintain their relationship with host communities and foster communities’ participation in 
addressing corporate impacts on them (see Fidler and Hitch, 2007).  
However, the participation of communities in negotiation and dialogue with the 
MNCs may have several shortcomings. Garvey and Newell (2005) and Newenham-Kahindi 
(2011), for example, argue that communities do not speak with one voice due to ambiguous 
and conflicting interests among them. Governments may also undermine the interest of the 
communities (Neu and Heincke, 2004) by creating corporate-community power imbalance in 
favour of MNCs (Webie, 2015), and accordingly restricting the available space within which 
the communities can contest their rights and responsibilities (Newell, 2005). In managing this 
problem through CSR practices, the MNCs tend to overwhelmingly focus on community 
development initiatives  as a means of managing and responding to community grievances, as 
well as making them benefit from resource extraction (Eweje, 2007; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 
2007a; 2011; 2014a; 2014b; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2004, 2007). However, 
stakeholders’ increasing criticisms of corporations in the extractive industry over the impacts 
of corporate operations on stakeholders and society, and the perceived inability of CSR to 
deliver on its promise have engendered a call for a shift from CSR to corporate accountability 
in the industry (Lauwo and Otusanya, 2014; Utting, 2008). This is because whereas corporate 
focus on community development initiatives is important, it tends to occlude the equally 
important need to hold corporations accountable in developing economies, often marred by 
weak market and governance institutions (Amaeshi et al., 2016; Garvey and Newell, 2005;  
Newell, 2001).  
Unfortunately, many of the extant studies on CSR in the Niger Delta of Nigeria have 
tended to focus on assessing the outcomes of CSR practices and less on the processes via 
which CSR seeks to contribute to community development (Idemudia, 2008). Hence, we are 
still unable to explain why, despite the increase in CSR spending and changes in oil MNCs’ 
CSR strategies, corporate-community relations remain conflictual (Idemudia, 2010a; 
Idemudia and Ite, 2006). Consequently, Idemudia (2008) has argued that we need to move 
from a focus on CSR outcomes (questions of whether CSR is good or bad for community 
development) to a focus on CSR processes (e.g. questions of accountability, transparency, 
power relations, etc.) if we are to better understand how and why CSR is (un)able to 
contribute to community development (see Idemudia, 2014a).  
Against this background, this paper critically examines Shell’s[1] GMoU in the Niger 
Delta via accountability and transparency theoretical frameworks. This is important as it 
helps to ascertain the extent to which GMoU, theoretically and practically, promotes 
corporate-community accountability necessary for fostering sustainable community 
development in Nigeria’s Niger-Delta. The paper continues with an overview of CSR in the 
Nigerian oil industry, explores the shifting from CSR discourse to corporate accountability 
before discussing corporate-community agreements in the extractive industry, as well as the 
emergence of the GMoU strategy in Shell’s community development efforts. It then proceeds 
to discuss the methodology, findings, and conclusion. 
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2. An overview of CSR in the Nigerian oil industry 
National CSR agenda is often a product of historical and cultural factors (Campbell, 
2008; Matten and Moon, 2008), and it often continues to mature according to the prevailing 
economic and political priorities of the country (Idemudia and Ite, 2006). In Nigeria, the 
proactive pursuit of CSR initiatives and their implementation as a business strategy is a 
relatively new and an emerging practice. However, CSR practices appear to have taken a 
strong root in the Nigerian oil and gas industry (Amao, 2008; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite 
2004) given the increase in CSR budgets over time (Aaron, 2011; Akpan, 2006; Frynas, 
2005; Idemudia and Ite, 2006; Ite, 2007). The prominence of CSR in the Nigerian oil industry 
stems from the fact that oil production remains core to the Nigerian economy and the 
negative social and environmental impacts associated with oil extraction are always at the 
centre of public scrutiny.  
For instance, the environmental degradation, high poverty, and the endemic nature of 
corporate–community conflict in the Niger Delta region where oil is mainly extracted, bring 
the oil MNCs into public gaze and scrutiny. Consequently, oil MNCs have had to develop 
different non-market strategies – often driven by corporate self-interest, the avoidance of 
negative reputational consequences and the quest for unhindered oil extraction (Aaron, 2011; 
Frynas 2005) – to respond to both local and international stakeholders’ pressures (Akpan, 
2006; Eweje, 2007) and secure SLO (Idemudia and Osanyande, 2016). In contrast, however, 
Ite (2004; 2007) contends that the MNCs’ pursuit of CSR activities in the Niger Delta is not 
mainly due to the need to secure/maintain SLO, but also emanates from a commitment to 
foster community development in the region. Similarly, others have suggested that a key 
driver of CSR practices in the Niger Delta is the Nigerian government’s failure to embark on 
community infrastructural development. This, according to many commentators, accounts for 
why the local communities in the region demand for and expect CSR contribution to 
community development (Akpan, 2006; 2008; Frynas, 2009; Ite, 2004).   
Notwithstanding, Idemudia (2014b) argues that this claim is too simplistic as the drive 
for greater demand for oil MNCs’ CSR initiatives goes beyond governmental failure, because 
communities’ demand for CSR is also due to the nature of oil business, the close relationship 
between oil MNCs and the Nigerian government, and the fact that oil MNCs will leave once 
oil wells dry up. While Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) suggest that the CSR initiatives of oil 
MNCs risk promoting governmental failure as the Nigerian government abandons its 
developmental responsibility to host communities, findings from Idemudia (2014b) suggest 
that oil MNCs’ CSR efforts have little or no relationship with governmental community 
development efforts in the region. Hence, he concludes that the close relationship between oil 
MNCs and the Nigerian government, and the very nature of oil extraction, tend to better 
explain why communities expect government-like functions from the companies. Essentially, 
rather than seeing CSR as a domain of shifting responsibility as Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) 
suggest, Idemudia (2014b) suggests that CSR is a domain of stakeholder contestation with 
negative consequences for community development. From this perspective, it can be argued 
that oil MNCs have both been victims and benefactors of governmental failure in the Niger 
Delta (Idemudia, 2010b).    
Nonetheless, the problems associated with doing business in Nigeria are well 
documented (see Economist, 2002). Issues of ethnicity and associated ethnic conflicts, 
absence of efficient social, economic, political institutions, and widespread corruption, 
allegedly pose formidable challenges to business in Nigeria (see Idemudia, 2007a). 
Consequently, Amaeshi et al. (2016) and Ite (2004) argued that the enabling environment for 
CSR is either lacking or yet-to-be developed, and at best, ineffective. This makes CSR 
practice in the oil industry not only difficult, but also often poor in innovativeness to deal 
with the unique challenges. Shell’s attempts to clean up oil spills during Rukpokwu spill in 
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Rivers State of Nigeria were stalled for months because of internal wrangling among 
communities over who should be awarded the contracts (SPDC, 2003). Consequently, the 
delayed remediation led to more severe environmental degradation and communities’ 
economic loss, which could have been prevented via early clean-up of the spill. Hence, 
internal divisions within communities and the associated conflicts in the Niger Delta hinder 
good CSR practices and limit the positive impacts of CSR initiatives on community 
development. 
Consequently, the debate on CSR practices in the Nigerian oil industry focuses on the 
relationship between CSR practices and community development.  This is premised on the 
assumption that if oil MNCs can contribute to community development via CSR, it will help 
to address local grievances, improve community livelihood and promote positive corporate-
community relations (Idemudia, 2010a). As such, a number of works have sought to either 
examine the most effective governance model for implementing CSR or focus on the extent 
to which CSR has promoted community development. For example, Idemudia (2009a) 
compares two types of corporate strategy (i.e. corporate-community foundation and In-house 
corporate-community investment models) adopted by different oil MNCs to contribute to 
community development and improve corporate legitimacy in the region. These models aim 
to help oil MNCs secure their SLO, promote positive stakeholder relationship, and contribute 
to community development. He argued that whilst the corporate-community foundation 
model is partly community-driven, mediated by development NGOs and allows decision-
making to be shared between the company and communities, the investment model is 
corporate-driven and managed in-house by the company. Therefore, the corporate-
community foundation model allows for better communication, improved opportunity to 
rebuild trust, and a more effective community engagement strategy compared to the in-house 
corporate-community investment model. Idemudia (2009a) thus concluded that given that 
two-way communication, trust and effective engagement are vital for community 
development, the corporate–community foundation is a likely better vehicle for oil MNCs to 
contribute to community development than the in-house corporate-community investment 
model.  
Similarly, Idemudia (2014c) recently compared the GMoU with the other two models 
and suggested that the GMoU model and the corporate-community foundation model share 
some common similarities as both enable some form of community participation in the CSR 
initiatives. For example, whilst the in-house corporate-community investment model is 
largely a top-down approach to project design and implementation devoid of community 
input (Ite, 2004), the GMoU model, like the corporate-community foundation, claims to 
follow a bottom-up approach. However, Idemudia (2014c) cautioned that each of these 
models has strengths and weaknesses from a corporate perspective with real implications for 
stakeholder relationship.    
Furthermore, there continues to remain disagreement about the extent to which the 
CSR initiatives of oil companies have contributed to community development in the region. 
For example, Akpan (2006; 2008) and Frynas (2005) have both argued that the CSR 
initiatives of oil MNCs have failed to contribute to community development and in some 
instances have caused inter- and intra-community conflicts (see also Aaron, 2011; 2012). In 
contrast, Ite (2005; 2007) suggested that the MNCs’ CSR initiatives have actually contributed 
to community development in the region given the extent of governmental failure. According 
to him, oil MNCs have continually changed their CSR strategies for improved responsiveness 
to their host communities. Yet,  Lompo and Trani (2013) recently offered a nuanced 
perspective by arguing that while the CSR initiatives of oil MNCs have contributed to access 
to basic capabilities like water, electricity and shelter, they have also undermined human 
development.  
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Similarly, Renouard and Lado (2012) noted that the CSR activities of oil MNCs have 
somewhat contributed to the improvement of the material well-being of some of the people 
living close to oil production sites, accompanied by deteriorated inequalities or ‘relational 
capabilities.’ This latter position seems to reaffirm the view that while the CSR initiatives of 
oil MNCs might address their affirmative duties (i.e., doing moral and social good), they fail 
to address their negative injunction duties (i.e., preventing harm and correcting injuries 
inflicted) (Idemudia, 2009b). This is consistent with other experiences from elsewhere 
captured in mainstream CSR discourse. Utting (2007), for example, noted that while CSR 
initiatives  might contribute to the ‘hard’ aspects of social development such as road and 
school construction or environmental protection, they often fail with regard to the ‘soft’ 
aspects of development such as empowerment, social justice, fairness and equality (see also 
Utting and Marques, 2010). Hence, Renouard and Lado, (2012) have concluded that oil 
MNCs in the Niger Delta need to focus on addressing those exceptional aspects of 
inequalities for which they are partly responsible.   
The foregoing debates have been particularly insightful in highlighting the strengths 
and limitations of CSR as a vehicle for furthering community development in weak 
institutional contexts. While Idemudia (2007b) points out that disjuncture in corporate-
community worldviews undermines CSR ability to contribute to community development, 
Frynas (2005) shows how CSR initiatives of oil MNCs are constrained by structural factors 
that undermine their effectiveness. Similarly, Eweje (2007) attributes the failure of CSR to 
deliver development to lack of trust between oil MNCs and local communities and the 
mismatch between corporate CSR rhetoric and CSR practices. However, these works suffer 
from two major shortcomings. First, in examining the relationship between CSR and 
community development, most of these works (except Idemudia, 2010b; 2014b) tend to over-
emphasize corporate responsibility without a commensurate attention to stakeholder 
reciprocal responsibility. Yet the success or failure of CSR practices to contribute to 
community development largely depends on corporate responsibility and stakeholder 
reciprocal responsibility as CSR practices do not occur in a vacuum (Idemudia, 2008; 2010b). 
Second, since most analyses of CSR-community development relation in the Niger Delta tend 
to focus on outcomes associated with CSR initiatives and not on the processes via which CSR 
supposedly contribute to community development, the issue of corporate accountability and 
its implications for the ability of CSR initiatives to contribute to community development 
have been largely ignored. Indeed, Garvey and Newell (2005) have noted that mainstream 
CSR discourse has often paid insufficient attention to the issue of corporate accountability, or 
the role of power vis-à-vis how the mechanisms of accountability and spaces of community 
participation in CSR initiatives work in practice. Yet this is particularly problematic given 
that numerous studies have demonstrated that corporate accountability is necessary if 
corporations are to contribute to community development (see Newell, 2001; 2008; Utting, 
2005; 2008). Consequently, to begin to address this gap, this paper seeks to explore the extent 
to which transparency and accountability, as well as participation are embedded in Shell’s 
GMoU strategy for contributing to community development in its host communities. 
 
3. Shifting from CSR discourse to corporate accountability   
The disagreements over the extent to which CSR has been able to contribute to 
community development in the Niger Delta, as highlighted above, have led to the view that 
the idea of CSR has outlived its usefulness, and that it is time to explore other more useful 
concepts like corporate accountability. Freeman and Liedtka (1991), in particular, argued that 
the idea of social responsibility has failed to help create the expected good society, and it has 
become a hindrance to meaningful conversations about corporations and good life. Hence, it 
should be abandoned. Corporate accountability, in a managerial sense, refers to issues of 
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disclosure, auditing and monitoring of business practices, which are also consistent with the 
traditional preoccupation about “how to keep power under control…how to prevent its abuse, 
how to subject it to certain procedures and rules of conduct” (Schedler, 1999, p. 13). It can be 
seen as “an emancipatory concept that can be used to explore the social relationship that 
exists between MNCs and their stakeholders with emphasis on external effects that relate to 
developing closer relationship and increasing transparency” (Odoeme, 2013, p. 747). Indeed, 
Utting and Marques (2010) note that ‘corporate accountability implies moving beyond ad hoc 
voluntary initiatives, top-down ‘doing gooding’ and very selective forms of stakeholder 
engagement. Instead it emphasises the need for mechanisms that oblige corporations to 
answer to various stakeholders, allow victims of corporate bad practices to channel 
grievances and seek redress, and entail consequences for companies that do not comply with 
agreed standards’. Central to this understanding of accountability are the concepts of 
‘answerability’ and enforceability. While answerability refers to the obligation to provide 
account for one’s action or inaction, enforceability refers to the mechanisms for realizing 
answerability and sanctioning its non-fulfillment where necessary (Schedler, 1999). 
Consequently, Newell (2003) has argued that while answerability has increased as more firms 
seek to validate their actions to a wide array of stakeholders affected by their activities via 
corporate reporting and disclosure, mechanisms of enforceability remain either weak or 
underdeveloped.  
Importantly, accountability apparently “conveys an image of transparency and 
trustworthiness” (Bovens, 2007, p. 448) as transparency suggests the rendering of things 
visible. Gray (1992, p. 415), for example, argues that:   
 
The development of accountability . . . increases the transparency of organisations. 
That is it increases the number of things that are made visible, increases the number of 
ways in which things are made visible, and, in doing so, encourages a greater 
openness.  
Although corporations apparently project a transparent posture, critics allude to the 
opaqueness of corporate transparency (Garsten and de Montoya, 2008; Roberts, 2009). This 
is because accountability and transparency are inseparably interwoven (Bovens, 2007). Gray 
et al. (2014) construe accountability as responsibilities to undertake actions and provide 
account of such actions to those with the rights to know, and a process of holding actors 
responsible for their actions. Unerman and O’Dwyer (2006, p. 351) argue that  accountability 
provides the “mechanisms through which all those affected by an organisation’s actions can 
demand an  account from the managers of that organisation regarding how and why the 
organisation has acted in the manner it has.” A corporation’s disclosure of their operational 
impacts on stakeholders is an essential element of accountability as Zadek (1998) argues for 
the increasing importance of corporations to not only alter their actions that affect 
stakeholders but also to report on the related social, ethical and environmental performance to 
enable stakeholders assess the extent to which the corporations have “listened” and responded 
to their expectations in practical terms.  
However, accountability and transparency are two important concepts contemporary 
corporations appear to appropriate to lend credibility to their enthusiasm about CSR 
(Christian Aid, 2004) under different guises ranging from self-imposed responsible business 
principles to adopted external codes such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Hence, 
Gray (2001) argues that accountability is a simple but often misused concept, whilst Bovens 
(2007) suggests it is generally appealing because it conveys a sense of transparency. Shearer 
(2002, p. 563) argues that accountability is an “intersubjective relationship whereby one is 
obligated to demonstrate the reasonableness of one’s actions to those to whom one is 
accountable.” Accordingly, these intersubjective relationships give these ‘others’ in 
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accountability relations with the companies the right to define the terms for judging the 
accountability outcome (Gray et al., 1997; Shearer, 2002). This is consistent with Sinclair’s 
(1995, p. 221) idea that accountability “presupposes agreement about what constitutes an 
acceptable performance … (including) the language of justification.” Engagement is thus 
fundamental to the determination of acceptable performance or accountability outcome. It is 
therefore not surprising that accountability is equally construed as democratically embedded 
(Archel et al., 2011; Brown and Dillard, 2013a, 2013b; Contrafatto et al., 2015; Gray et al., 
2014). This suggests that the democratic nature of accountability is reflected in discourses 
relating to giving voices to the accountees. For example, Bovens argues that accountability 
transcends monologue, propaganda or a mere giving of information because it must entrench 
a mechanism for debate and engagement.   However, Adams (2004) and Unerman and 
Bennett (2004) argue that engagement is not identical to accountability but facilitates a 
mechanism that promotes it. But as dialogue or engagement is embedded in power relations, 
meaningful engagement is doubtful when the engaging parties have power asymmetry 
(Archel et al., 2011; Dillard, 2011; Gray, 2000, 2001; Gray, et al., 1997; Owen et al., 2001; 
Unerman and Bennett, 2004). 
Nevertheless, greater corporate-community engagement is advocated in the extractive 
industry to promote cordial corporate-community relationship (Gilberthorpe and Banks, 
2012), because mutual understanding and trust are vital for peaceful and harmonious 
corporate-community relationships (Idemudia, 2014a). A truly managed CSR practice that 
promotes the voices and expectations of the communities will apparently sustain corporate 
SLO (Slack, 2012).  Despite the apparent corporate-community power asymmetry, the Niger 
Delta communities and oil MNCs in Nigeria consider corporate-community engagement as a 
(potential) strategy for promoting responsible corporate behaviour and accountability (Egbon, 
2014) given that accountability is equally construed as “informed relations of trust” (Dar, 
2014, p. 133). An engagement that does not privilege the dominant voice will likely promote 
CSR practices that incorporate the expectations of beneficiaries negatively impacted by 
corporate operations. Such engagement is embedded in dialogic logic or action (see 
Bebbington et al., 2007; Contrafatto et al., 2015).  
Engagement drawing on dialogic logic is not oblivious of differences in the 
worldviews of the various stakeholders but focuses on building informed consensus that 
obliterate the dominance of each stakeholder’s primordial position. As Bebbington et al. 
(2007, p. 364) argue, “both parties commit to a process whereby both expect to learn 
something of the worldview of the other, both address structural issues that constrain them 
and collectively they strive to create some better outcome.” This suggests that dialogic 
engagement seeks out and problematises the conflict situation with a view to cooperatively 
articulate feasible solutions that will not impose the primordial ideology of the dominant 
group (see Contrafatto et al., 2015). Consequently, Bebbington et al. (2007) argue that 
successful dialogue occurs within open (transparent) processes in which each dialoguing 
individual is accorded the rights to speak, be heard, and be able to exercise agency. 
According to Bebbington et al. (2007, p. 372),  
 
A focus on stakeholders and their participation in organizational processes may also 
reflect a more dialogic framing of accountability. This would have two elements to it: 
dialogic entitlements (for example, information and participation rights) and dialogic 
institutions (where views can be debated in robust fashion).  
In this sense, accountability is about how relationships among multiple actors are 
negotiated, reproduced and reinforced to create a continually evolving “system of reciprocal 
rights and obligations” (Dixon et al. 2006, p. 407). While some scholars have focused on  
either ‘upward’ flow of accountability to ‘external’ social agent via formal reporting, or 
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‘downward’ flow of accountability to lower level institutions or groups, others have focused 
on lateral accountabilities to stakeholders that are situated inside organizational settings 
(Kemp et al., 2012). This is because in tracking the directionality of accountability, the 
concept can be seen as an expression of the complex interactions and mutual dependencies 
between an organization and its multiple stakeholders (Lozano, 2004). Hence, Kemp et al. 
(2012) argued that this approach to accountability can open up discursive spaces that go 
beyond just verification and auditing, but towards engaging accountability’s dialogic 
potential for shared reflection and learning. As such, Garvey and Newell (2005) have noted 
that one of the important elements of accountability within corporate-community relations is 
the corporation’s adopted approach for beneficiaries’ participation. Essentially, accountability 
and transparency encourage engagement, trust, giving of voices and information sharing, 
which are fundamental to cordial corporate-community relations. As such, Idemudia (2009, 
p. 140) argues that “allowing for accountability and sustainability mechanisms in CSR 
projects is important in an environment like the Niger Delta where conflict is endemic.”  
Unfortunately, ‘processes of accountability continue to be obscured within scholarly debates 
about CSR in the extractive industries’ (Kemp et al., 2012).  In that regard, Kemp et al. 
(2012) suggested the need to shift from current conventional auditing culture referred to as 
‘new accounting’ towards strengthening operational-level knowledge about accountability as 
a basis for a better understanding of corporate social performance. This paper seeks to 
directly respond to this call within the context of the Niger Delta. 
 
4.1 Corporate-community agreements and the extractive industry  
It is evident that resource extraction can produce both negative and positive impacts 
on local communities (Basu et al., 2015; Kemp et al., 2011; Moffat and Zhang, 2014). 
However, the positive benefits of resource extraction for communities can easily be eroded 
by their negative social and environmental impacts, which have historically been the case in 
most developing countries (Basu et al., 2015). Corporate negative environmental impacts 
promote criticism from stakeholders and possibly corporate legitimacy crisis (see Botes and 
Samkin, 2013; Matilal and Höpfl, 2009). As such, O’Faircheallaigh (2013) contends that 
corporate-community agreements provide opportunities for local communities to shape the 
conditions of resource extraction on their land and therefore redistribute the balance of power 
that has traditionally served to undermine their rights and marginalize their developmental 
priorities. Indeed, company-community agreement is now widely considered to be a practical 
mechanism for recognizing the rights, needs and priorities of local communities as key 
‘stakeholders’ that are impacted by resource extraction, for managing the impacts of resource 
extraction and ensuring that the benefits derived are widely shared (Keenan et al., 2016). In 
that regard, Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) between local communities, 
corporations and government agencies are seen as useful mechanism through which the 
extractive industries (i.e., mining, oil and gas, and forestry) can contribute to community 
development, meet regulatory requirements, define stakeholder expectations and mutual 
obligations and manage non-technical risks (Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Fidler and Hitch, 
2007; Baynes et al., 2016). However, the challenge of negotiating and implementing 
agreement that potentially contributes to community development while also ensuring that 
risks and impacts associated with resource extraction are successfully managed remains 
problematic (Keenan et al., 2016).   
Nevertheless, corporate-community agreements often take many names, structures 
and processes (Brereton et al., 2011). For example, varying degrees of MoUs are articulated 
in the literature using various terminologies such as community development agreement 
[CDA] (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; 2015), community benefits agreement [CBA] (Fidler and 
Hitch, 2007; O’Fairchealliagh, 2013), memorandum of understanding [MoU] (Leke et al., 
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2014; O’Faircheallaigh, 2015) and global memorandum of understanding [GMoU] (Idemudia 
and Osayande, 2016), negotiated environmental agreement [NEA] (Noble and Nick, 2011). A 
review of the literature suggests that CDAs, CBAs, NEAs are partly backed by legal or quasi-
legal frameworks and so are usually not only a voluntary corporate initiative (see 
O’Faircheallaigh, 2015). However, the distinction between the various forms of MoUs 
appears to be slippery, as only few works have paid particular attention to the differences. For 
instance, O’Faircheallaigh (2015) argues that CDAs range from legally binding contracts to 
voluntary MoUs. But many other studies on CDAs apparently take such distinction for 
granted except O’Faircheallaigh’s (2015) study that clearly stated it focused on legally 
binding CDAs. At any rate, MoUs could also be contemplated among tiers of governments, 
which McCrimmon and Fanning (2010) conceptualized as formalised non-binding 
agreements between parties, which can also be ignored by the consenting parties. MoUs are 
not legally binding but based on mutual obligation. McCrimmon and Fanning (2010) 
articulated some critical success factors of MoU such as unambiguous mutual desire to 
cooperate, negotiated priorities, outcomes upon which to situate accountability, inclusivity, 
and transfer of financial resources if part of the MoU. Thus, a good MoU stipulates the 
activities to be carried out and how expectations should be monitored. Integral to MoU 
signing is the recognition that the parties are partners and would assume leadership role vis-a-
vis the MoU subject-matter (Leke et al., 2014).  However, it is important to recognize that 
MoUs are products of negotiation and bargaining between the consenting parties and can be 
prejudiced by unequal power relations (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013; 2015). As such, the core 
challenge confronting corporate-community MoUs is that they are often informed by the 
unequal power relationship that exists between corporations and communities, and thus the 
limited nature of enforceability mechanisms in such agreements (O’Fairchealliagh, 2013).   
Nevertheless, the enforceability of MoU is often predicated on the assumption that 
corporations now need both legal licence and SLO (Lacey et al., 2012). Indeed, SLO 
“involves having the acceptance and approval (and perhaps support and consent) of local 
communities to operate” (Lacey et al., 2012, p. vi). Whereas MoUs or CDAs are formalised 
written agreements, an SLO is an informal, intangible and unwritten implicit licence  (Owen 
and Kemp, 2013) that is slippery to monitor/measure (Lacey et al., 2012) as what constitutes 
it is less developed (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Although SLO is an implicit licence, its 
absence supposedly produces untoward consequences for corporations especially in the form 
of a legitimacy crisis that can undermine business operations. SLO is apparently more 
complex to articulate than MoU in a corporate-community context as the community 
stakeholders give legitimacy to the latter whereas stakeholders extending beyond the local 
community give legitimacy to the former (see Esteves and Barclay, 2011; Lacey et al., 2012; 
Prno and Slocombe, 2012).  
An MoU portrays corporate commitment to community development in part, at least, 
to sustain corporate legitimacy. Consequently, MoU could be construed as a means to gain 
and/or sustain SLO because working with the communities to meet their expectations and 
avoid conflicts is central to the process of maintaining SLO (Lacey et al., 2012; Moffat and 
Zhang, 2014). MNCs are increasingly under pressure from stakeholders to demonstrate their 
SLO credential (O’Faircheallaigh, 2013), which makes SLO an integral part of stakeholders’ 
discourses in the extractive industry (O’Faircheallaigh, 2015). As such, it has been argued 
that corporations mostly use CSR initiatives to gain SLO (Prno and Slocombe, 2012; Ruwhiu 
and Carter, 2016). Although GMoU, not SLO, is the emphasis of this study, an SLO is 
apparently strengthened by the adoption of [G]MoU in the Niger Delta context. However, as 
previously mentioned, an obvious weakness of corporate voluntary initiatives like the GMoU, 
is the lack of mechanism to enforce performance (O’Faircheallaigh, 2015).  This is 
particularly the case given that oil MNCs can use their discursive power to appropriate the 
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meaning of SLO and accountability so as to claim reputational benefits while masking the 
gaps between company and stakeholder expectations (Owen and Kemp, 2013). In contrast, in 
their study of a poor township in South Africa, McIntyre et al. (2015) found that poor 
communities believed that they have influence over the extension of SLO. Consequently, it is 
important to examine the process rather than just the outcome of corporate voluntary 
initiatives such as the GMoU.  
The need to assess CSR process via accountability and transparency lens is due partly 
to corporate-community power asymmetry and the need to better understand its implication 
for company and stakeholder expectations. Power asymmetry in corporate-community 
relations and engagement favours corporations (Kemp et al., 2011; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). 
Imbalance in power sharing between actors undermines equal sharing of decision-making, 
authority and responsibility, thus engendering conflicts (Baynes et al., 2016). Good 
governance is one that devolves power to the community stakeholders to mitigate unequal 
power relations, to promote equitable control and decision-making. According to Baynes et 
al. (2016, p. 169), “governance itself is more about the power to make, implement and 
enforce decisions, rather than just the formal arrangements about how decisions are supposed 
to be made”. Power, dialogue and participation are important in promoting mutual beneficial 
corporate-community relations and ensuring that CSR projects meet stakeholder expectations 
(Kemp et al., 2011).  With mining companies usually perceived as undermining the voices of 
community stakeholders (Basu et al., 2015), granting communities voices in corporate 
matters affecting them engenders cooperation (Moffat and Zhang, 2014). Importantly, 
accountability-linked strategies such as continual communication, transparent information 
disclosure to communities and strong CDAs [or MoUs] have been inextricably linked to the 
strengthening of corporate legitimacy (see Moffat and Zhang, 2014; Owen and Kemp, 2012).   
 
4.2 Shell and community development: the emergence of GMoU strategy 
The nascent stage of CSR development in Nigeria has meant that CSR policies and 
practices are continually evolving, and as in most other countries, the CSR agenda that 
companies in Nigeria pursue depends heavily on how the corporation conceptualizes and 
understands CSR (Idemudia, 2007a). Various corporations constantly seek to tailor their 
corporate strategy for meeting their CSR obligations to the demands of their business 
environment by seeking to improve upon shortcomings in previous strategies. A good 
example is Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria’s (SPDC) CSR initiatives that 
have gradually evolved from mere Community Assistance (CA) in the 1960s, to Community 
Development (CD) in the 1990s, and Sustainable Community Development (SCD) in 2004 
(see SPDC, 2003; 2004). According to SPDC (2004), this strategic transition from CA to 
SCD was in part an attempt by the corporation to respond to increasing community pressures 
for it to do more as well as improve the impact of its CD programmes on host communities. 
As such, Ite (2007) attributes the changes in SPDC’s CSR strategies to a combination of 
internal consideration and external pressures.  
However, others such as Akpan (2006), Eweje (2007) and Idemudia (2010a, 2009b) 
attribute the changes to the fact that both the CA and CD strategies often lacked community 
input in the design and implementation of CSR, which meant that either CSR resources were 
misallocated or hijacked by a few community elites. Similarly, the poor implementation of 
CSR projects and their lack of sustainability was also another factor that drove the changes in 
Shell’s CSR strategy (Draper, 2010; Ite, 2007). Indeed, Ite (2007) suggested that a major 
problem with Shell’s CSR strategies, which also explains why they failed to produce the 
desired result, relates to the company’s tendency to take a partial rather than holistic approach 
to community development. To address these problems, Shell recently turned to corporate-
NGO-community partnership called Global Memorandum of Understanding to contribute to 
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community development in its host communities and secure its SLO (Idemudia and 
Osanyande, 2016).  
Unlike MoUs that are often an agreement between a particular community and a 
company, a GMoU is an agreement between Shell and a cluster of several communities 
identified based on local government area, ethnicity and historical affinities. Under the terms 
of the agreement, Shell provides funding for five years and the communities decide, plan and 
implement community development projects.  In addition, Shell facilitates the capacity 
building of the GMoUs by providing access to development experts usually their NGO 
partners to oversee project implementation. The Community Development Board (CDB) is 
the core governance institution of the GMoU, and it is supposedly embedded in the 
participating communities via the community trust. The Community Trust (CT) consists of 
ten persons with at least three women who are usually resident in and trusted within the 
participating communities. From these ten CT members, each community provides three 
persons with at least one woman to establish the CDB. Hence, the community trusts are 
responsible for ensuring that the GMoUs’ benefits reach their individual communities via 
effective representation of their respective communities at the CDB. The CDB is responsible 
for managing and coordinating the development activities of the GMoU across all the 
communities in a given cluster. 
The CDB consists of all the chairpersons, secretaries and members of the CT, a 
representative of SPDC, local government, state government, The Niger Delta Development 
Commission, National Petroleum Investment Management Services and donor community. 
However, Alfred (2013) has noted that with the exception of SPDC’s representatives, the 
other representatives appear to be uninterested. Nonetheless, each CDB has standing 
committees for finance and resources management, partnering, communication and capacity 
building, peace and conflict resolution, and technical matters. Furthermore, the CDBs are 
entitled to a small percentage of the annual negotiated sum from the GMoU agreement to 
manage their administrative functions. Finally, the GMoU is underpinned by an Operations 
Policy and Procedure Guidelines (OPPG) as the CDB becomes the only legitimate 
interlocutor recognized by SPDC in its engagement with its host communities. As at 2011, 
SPDC has signed and implemented agreements with twenty-seven clusters that cover two 
hundred and ninety communities (representing about thirty percent of its host communities) 
and nine of the twenty-seven CDBs have grown to become registered foundations that 
receive third party funding (Shell Companies in Nigeria, 2013).  
The GMoU initiative cuts across a wide range of areas such as economic 
empowerment, capacity building and improving the quality of life of host communities. In 
contrast to the various variants of MoUs in the mining sectors of Canada, Australia, Papua 
New Guinea articulated largely around socio-economic benefits and environmental impact 
mitigation, Shell’s GMoU does not contemplate addressing environmental concerns. 
However, in contrast to Shell’s CA or CD strategies that were largely top-down, the GMoU 
appears to be a bottom-up process that gives voice to communities and put them in the 
driving seat of their own development. In addition, the model claims to be an instrument for 
effective community engagement based on transparency and accountability.  However, Aaron 
(2012) has argued that while the turn to GMoU by Shell in Nigeria is a radical departure from 
its previous CSR strategies, the GMOU is still being plagued by old challenges and as such 
has failed to deliver sustainable development benefits for the Niger Delta people. In contrast, 
Alfred (2013) commended the success of the GMoU so far.  Indeed, based on a participatory 
stakeholder evaluation, Hoben et al. (2012) suggested that despite some weaknesses, the 
GMoU is contributing to community development in the region. For Idemudia and Osayande 
(2016), this disagreement is partly due to the difficulty of measuring the impact of CSR in the 
Niger Delta, yet it supports our view that debate over the relationship between CSR and 
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development in the region tends to focus more on the developmental outcomes of CSR rather 
than the process through which CSR seeks to contribute to development. Consequently, our 
findings here will contribute to the extant literature on CSR and community development in 
two ways. First, it would deepen our understanding of CSR and community development 
relationship by addressing an aspect of the relationship that has so far been under-explored 
within the context of the Niger Delta. Second, the findings presented here will complement 
extant works by identifying potential areas of corporate–community agreement that need to 
be strengthened if CSR initiatives are to deliver on their promise. 
 
5. Research design 
The data for this study is generated from Shell’s GMoU reports of 2010-2013, which 
included the first and most recent (as far as we are aware). The GMoU reports were obtained 
via the internet. Nonetheless, these reports are comparatively similar in content, except that 
while the 2010 documents referred to the GMoU as a signed agreement, the others called it a 
written statement. This change is immaterial and so does not merit any attention here. 
Corporations use various channels such as newsletter, annual reports, verbal, advertising and 
public relations brochure to communicate with their stakeholders (Buhr, 1998) with such 
reports apparently capturing management representation of reality (Bebbington, 1999).  The 
GMoU document is a specialised stand-alone report published by Shell Companies in Nigeria 
and it is an important document as it focuses solely on Shell’s GMoU performance and 
process.  
An interpretive or qualitative content analysis is used to analyse the GMoU texts 
according to themes that are drawn from the background theoretical review in this study. 
Belal and Momin (2009), Gray et al. (1995), and Tregidga et al. (2012), for example, have 
highlighted the broad use of content analysis (primarily quantitative or form-oriented content 
analysis) in prior studies in social and environmental accountability research (SEAR), but 
Milne and Adler (1999) criticised the use of content analysis in SEAR in terms of the 
reliability of the coding instruments adopted in classifying corporate disclosures. However, 
Milne and Adler (1999) apparently focus on quantitative rather than qualitative content 
analysis. As content analysis can be employed as both quantitative and qualitative analytical 
methods, Smith and Taffler (2000), Merkl-Davis et al. (2011) and Vourvachis and 
Woodward (2015) distinguish between form-oriented (quantitative) and meaning-oriented 
(qualitative/interpretive/thematic) content analysis. Whilst the form variant focuses on 
counting of words or other concrete references, the meaning variant analyses themes 
embedded in the texts being investigated. The form-oriented content analysis has been 
dominant in social and environmental accountability research.  
Some scholars consider critical discourse analysis as a type of meaning-oriented 
content analysis (see Merkl-Davis et al., 2011; Vourvachis and Woodward, 2015). Meaning-
oriented content analysis is also considered by some scholars as thematic analysis (see Marks 
and Yardley, 2004). Whilst Marks and Yardley (2004) suggest that thematic analysis [or 
meaning-oriented content analysis] could be deductive or inductive, Vourvachis and 
Woodward (2015) suggest that it could be deductive, abductive or inductive. Inductive 
content analysis suggests that the coding of themes is data-driven and abductive content 
analysis suggests an iterative generation of coding themes by moving forward and backward 
between data and theoretical concepts. The deductive approach draws from existing 
theoretical ideas for the purpose of coding. According to Marks and Yardley (2004), such 
deductively derived themes allow for replicability, extension, or refutation, of prior 
discoveries. This study adopts this form of meaning-oriented content analysis, which 
Vourvachis and Woodward (2015) also refer to as semantic analysis and for which the coded 
categories must reflect the purpose of the research to give validity to the coding.   
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This study is guided by a coding guide involving issues of accountability and 
transparency, community participation, control and ownership of GMOU processes. Hence, 
we adopt Gill’s (2000) notion of ‘sceptical reading’, which implies searching for purpose 
lurking behind the ways something is said or represented. Indeed, Gill (1996) suggests 
treating the way something is said as being ‘a solution to a problem’, which informed how we 
organised our analysis. To overcome potential bias, the authors compared notes afterwards 
and resolved any disagreements. Evidently, the narratives in the GMoU documents appear to 
communicate the responsiveness of Shell to stakeholders’ criticisms regarding its deficient 
process of sustainable community development initiatives.[2]. Shell’s GMoU disclosures 
appear to focus attention on key issues on which it, and generally companies in the extractive 
industries, is/are criticised by stakeholders in resonance with Merkl-Davis et al.’s (2013) 
assertion that CSR communication is acute during periods of controversy or conflict.    
 
6. GMoU through corporate accountability lens: analysis and discussion 
For the purpose of this study, we particularly focus on three aspects of the GMoU 
processes that traditionally have been the basis of criticisms of Shell’s CSR initiatives in the 
Niger Delta, and which the new GMoU strategy supposedly addresses. These issues are 
community participation in their own development; accountability and transparency between 
Shell and its host communities, and the control and ownership of GMoU processes to ensure 
project sustainability (see Akpan, 2006; Frynas, 2005; Idemudia, 2009b; 2007b; Ite, 2007). 
 
6.1 GMoU as a participatory dialogic approach to community development 
As the background literature suggests, one of the areas Shell and other oil companies 
in Nigeria have been criticised vis-à-vis their CSR initiatives involves their unilateral 
determination of community development projects, which are apparently different to 
communities’ priorities. Consequently, engagement and communication are essential to 
understanding the needs and priorities of the communities. Shell considers the GMoU as a 
veritable means of communicating and engaging with the communities by stating that:  
They [GMoUs] encourage greater participation and create a more open and 
transparent way for SPDC to communicate with communities and help support social 
investment projects (Shell Companies in Nigeria [SCIN hereafter], 2010, p. 1)  
Indeed, the GMoU is a departure from the unorganised MoUs with individual 
communities which appear to create divisions and mutual suspicions among communities. 
These organised GMoUs appear to reflect local concerns when the choice of community 
projects are decided and managed by the communities themselves.  This might account for 
why Shell considers it a more robust approach claiming that: 
This system [GMoU] replaces the previous approach whereby SPDC agreed to 
hundreds of separate development projects with individual communities and managed 
them directly and separately (SCIN, 2013, p. 1).   
As such, in order to demonstrate the participatory nature of the GMoUs, Shell states 
that: 
Under the terms of the GMoU, the communities decide the development they want 
while SPDC on behalf of its joint venture partners provide secure funding for five 
years ensuring that communities have stable and reliable finances as they undertake 
the implementation of their community development plan (SCIN, 2011, p. 1)  
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While there is no doubt that the new GMoU strategy has opened some space for 
community participation that was lacking in Shell’s previous CSR strategy, there is a need to 
interpret such participation with caution given that corporate-community power asymmetry is 
often likely to sway corporate-community participatory dialogue toward corporate advantage 
(Kemp et al., 2011; O’Faircheallaigh, 2013). Besides, meaningful engagement takes place in 
a dialogic context where the view of a subset or dominant group is not subtly imposed on the 
other engaging stakeholders.  This unfortunately seems not to be the case as Idemudia and 
Osanyande (2016, p. 9) argue that “while the GMoU is supposedly a bottom-up participatory 
approach to community development, there continue[s] to remain key structural constraints of 
the ability of communities to actively participate in their own development and in the 
governance of corporate-community relations”. This is because the boundaries of community 
participation is set within a particular understanding of the process of development in which 
oil extraction is central and alternative meanings and pathways to development are 
foreclosed. In other words, community participation is restricted to how oil funds provided by 
Shell for community development are to be spent as opposed to the more substantive question 
of whether oil extraction should continue to be a basis for community development in the 
face of the negative externalities it has generated. For instance, Faleti (2004) noted that there 
is often significant anger within communities over environmental degradation associated with 
dredging, contamination, spills and salt water inflow that negatively impact local livelihoods; 
but these issues are not incorporated into the scope of the activities covered by the GMoU. 
The implication therefore is that GMoU promotes a particular form of community 
participation that is consistent with oil MNCs’ interest of continuing oil extraction in the 
region. Hence, it can be argued that while the GMoU does allow for community consultation, 
it does not yet foster substantive community participation in corporate-led community 
development initiatives. 
 
6.2 Transparency and accountability between communities and oil MNC   
A core driver of corporate-community conflicts in the Niger delta is the lack of trust 
(Eweje, 2007; Idemudia, 2007b) and the mismanagement/misappropriation of CSR funds 
meant for community development  by a few. Consequently, an emphasis on transparency in 
the GMoU is particularly important in any efforts to rebuild trust between communities and 
Shell as well as ensure sustainable community development. Indeed, the extant literature has 
strongly linked effective engagement or participation to transparency and accountability. 
Thus, Shell highlights that: 
The GMoU represents an important shift in approach, placing emphasis on more 
transparent and accountable process, regular communication with grassroots, 
sustainability and conflict prevention (SCIN, 2010, 2011, p. 1) 
It also ensures high levels of transparency, inclusiveness and accountability in 
managing development funds (SCIN, 2013, p. 1) 
Shell Sustainability Report (2011, p. 1) also asserts that: “we [Shell] believe 
transparency in our operations helps build trust”. However, we found that the emphasis on 
transparency and accountability in the GMoU reports was on the activities of, and amongst, 
the clusters of communities in GMoU, as opposed to the accountability and transparency 
between Shell and the clusters of communities. In other words, there was an absence of 
reference to corporate-community transparency and accountability. Hence, while the GMoU 
for good reasons emphasises issues of transparency and accountability in the activities of the 
clusters within the GMoU, questions of corporate-community accountability seemed to have 
been selectively ignored.  This position is supported by the fact that in a recent effort to 
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assess the impact of its GMoU, Shell narrowly and vaguely defined the criteria of 
transparency and accountability as follows: 
 This refers to openness to public scrutiny, available, accessible and disclosed 
information on processes, activities and transactions, and periodic stewardship 
feedback. It implies the extent to which GMoU processes especially the institution is 
open to scrutiny and provides information on its activities to its stakeholders 
(Idemudia and Osanyande, 2016).  
The consequence is that while Shell systematically downplays the importance of its 
accountability obligations to communities and ignores the role of the lack of corporate 
accountability in corporate-community conflict, it invariably suggests that the lack of 
transparency and accountability within local communities is responsible for problems 
associated with community development and corporate-community conflict.  This is largely 
consistent with Gray’s (2001) assertion that accountability can be misplaced or misused. In 
other words, corporations might rhetorically appropriate accountability to maintain the 
dominant social ideology (see Garsten and de Montoya, 2008; Moneva et al., 2006; Stoney 
and Winstanley, 2001).  
Despite the significant environmental impacts of the oil and gas MNCs in the Niger 
Delta of Nigeria (UNEP, 2011), we found that Shell’s GMoU reports are conspicuously silent 
on the environmental impacts of the corporation. This silence is an obvious lack of 
transparency and accountability in relation to environmental sustainability. However,  it is not 
surprising that the GMoU fails to directly address the issue of environmental degradation, 
which resonates with Hassan and Kouhy’s (2015) recent argument that oil MNCs operating 
in the Niger Delta show weak commitments to environmental accountability. The implication 
here is that accountability and transparency seem to be interpreted in a very selective and 
restrictive manner by Shell such that it applies only to the relationship between the 
communities in a cluster, but not to the relationship between communities and Shell. This 
perhaps explains why despite increase in community development spending, corporate-
community conflict continues to remain endemic. This is because as Idemudia (2009b) 
argues, no amount of roads, schools or hospitals constructed can compensate for or alleviate 
environmental degradation or its effects on local communities. 
 
6.3 Governance, control and ownership of CSR initiatives  
  A major factor that undermined the ability of Shell’s previous CSR strategy to 
contribute to community development was lack of sense of ownership of CSR process and 
initiatives by host communities, which often resulted in the poor sustainability of CSR 
projects (Idemudia, 2009; Ite, 2004; 2007). Indeed, Frynas (2005) and Ite (2004) have 
suggested that this problem has resulted in the proliferation of a kind of ‘dependency 
mentality’ among host communities that has led to more demands being made on oil MNCs. 
However, Idemudia (2014b) disputes this suggestion that a ‘dependency mentality’ pervades 
local communities as empirical data showed that not only were communities aware of their 
reciprocal responsibility but also were willing to undertake such responsibility. Nonetheless, 
Idemudia (2009b) noted that because of lack of sense of ownership due to the absence of 
community control over CSR initiatives, communities often lacked both the capacity and 
interest to maintain such CSR projects as they were seen as Shell’s projects. Consequently, 
the turn to GMoU strategy potentially and partly addressed this problem. Indeed, SPDC notes 
that: 
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It [GMoU] brings those communities together with representatives of local and state 
governments, SPDC and non-profit organisations (development NGOs) in a decision-
making committee. These committees – which are not controlled by SPDC – give 
communities greater control and ownership over their own development. … (SCIN, 
2010, p. 1)   
As such, Shell asserts that: 
… GMoUs have engendered better ownership and a stronger sense of pride amongst 
communities as they are responsible for implementing their projects. (SCIN, 2013, p. 
1)  
Similarly, the nature of inclusivity in the GMoU’s governance structure might suggest 
that communities are likely to be insulated from undue corporate influence. For example, the 
inclusion of NGOs as capacity builders and the expectation that other actors like NGOs and 
government representatives will be active within the GMoU should in principle allow 
communities take control and ownership over the decision-making process concerning their 
own development. In addition, the GMoU’s governance structure appears to weaken 
accusation against Shell that its CSR creates an opportunistic tendency for community elites 
to capture CSR benefits at the expense of their communities (see Idemudia, 2010a). With this 
approach, the community representatives know the amount of money that accrues to their 
communities and they also exercise control over how such monies are expended. For 
example, Shell asserts that:  
SPDC provides the committee … with secure funding for five years, ensuring that the 
communities have stable and reliable finances as they undertake their work. … 
Communities identify their own needs, decide how to spend the money, and 
implement projects by themselves (SCIN, 2010, p. 1)  
The significance of the above assertion stems from the fact that in Shell’s old CSR 
strategy, CSR projects were often either poorly implemented or not utilised as they were 
inconsistent with communities’ priorities (Akpan, 2006; Idemudia, 2009b). Hence, it suggests 
that the incidence of abandonment of CSR projects in communities will be unlikely. 
Importantly, this again is supported by the fact that communities are given voice to select 
their projects to match their allocated GMoU funds over a period of time. However, in 
practice, the extent to which communities exercise control over the GMoU remains 
debatable. First, as previously noted, while other actors like NGOs and government actors are 
expected to be full participants in the activities of the GMoU, in reality they are often not 
active. Similarly, communities have no say over which NGOs Shell nominates to facilitate 
their capacity building. For example, Shell’s and Daper’s claims below on the participation of 
independent development experts in the GMoU process are apparently contradictory: 
   
SPDC also provides access to development experts to oversee project implementation 
and build the capacity of the CDBs to grow into functional community development 
foundations (SCIN, 2013, p. 1) 
Weak local NGO capacity has led to NGO staff invariably following instructions from 
SPDC implementation staff. The NGOs are often unable to achieve an equal dialogue 
with SPDC … Any perceived opposition to SPDC’s interests is dismissed, and NGOs 
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fear ‘losing their contract’ if they fail to follow SPDC instructions (Draper, 2010, p. 
72)  
This implies that the countervailing force to Shell’s undue influence over the GMoU 
is absent in reality. Furthermore, the approval of funding to clusters/communities comes with 
a stringent but unpublicized conditionality. This undisclosed clause integral to the GMoU is 
called Freedom-To-Operate (FTO). We understood this through the interactions with some 
community members and two NGOs that assist Shell in the implementation of its GMoU 
initiative. This suggests that GMoU is embedded in power relations and ultimately serve as 
an instrument to further stifle communities’ power to undermine corporate interest. The 
implication is that communities’ actual control over GMoU is at best limited and not based 
on corporate-community accountability.   
 
6   Conclusion and emerging issues 
There are three main emerging issues. First, it seems that in principle, the GMoU 
embodies some of the critical success factors for an MOU as suggested by McCrimmon and 
Fanning (2010), but lacks other core success factors in practice. For example, inclusivity, and 
transfer of funds, that are key success factors seem to be recognised in the GMoU model. 
However, the GMoU seems to fall short in the areas of outcomes upon which to situate 
accountability, negotiated priorities and efforts to prevent the undue influence of Shell over 
the GMoU due to corporate-community unequal power relationship. Hence, while the GMoU 
is certainly an improvement over previous CSR strategies, it is still unlikely a panacea for 
issues related to sustainable community development in the Niger Delta.   
Second, The GMoU is at present informed by a restrictive interpretation of 
participation, a selective application of transparency and accountability, and remains 
squarely under the control of Shell. Hence, contrary to O’Faircheallaigh’s (2013) suggestion 
that corporate-community agreement allows for the redistribution of power between 
corporations and communities, the GMoU seems to consolidate power in the hands of Shell 
via a strategy of accommodation by legitimation (see Hamman and Acutt, 2003) that 
minimises corporate criticism as well as limits further demands that can be made on Shell. In 
other words, the changes that Shell has made to its CSR strategy allows the company to 
project an image of being responsive to the demands of external stakeholders without given 
up control over its corporate-driven community development efforts. Indeed, while changes 
to its CSR strategies might be seen as an indirect form of answerability and the GMoU 
reports as a direct form, GMoU lacks any measure of enforceability which is a necessity if 
corporate-community accountability is to be meaningful. As such, the GMoU as a form of 
corporate-community agreement seems to confirm Garvey and Newell’s (2005) assertion that 
the mechanisms of enforceability remain either underdeveloped or, in this case, are 
selectively and deliberately ignored.    
Third, for GMoU to fully realise its potential and ensure that increase in CSR 
spending leads to win-win outcomes for both communities and Shell, then Shell must 
deliberately promote upward, downward and lateral accountabilities of its GMoUs. This 
would require Shell to relinquish more control over the GMoU and accept that the absence of 
total corporate control comes with some risks as well as sustainable benefits. In other words, 
Shell needs to adopt what Schmitt (2010) has described as ‘open strategizing’, suggesting an 
open approach to building stakeholder relation in which stakeholders are allowed to 
collaboratively navigate through a number of diverse and challenging socio-political and 
ecological issues without following a rigidly structured management plan. Indeed, Schmitt 
(2010) suggests that Shell successfully used this strategy to manage and implement the 
Camisea gas project in Peru within a difficult business environment.  
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Notes 
1. Subsidiary of Royal/Dutch Shell in Nigeria 
2. Soobaroyen and Mahadeo (2016), for example, find that companies in Mauritius 
change disclosures regarding their CSR practices as a reaction to local tensions and 
government policy in a manner to manage public impression. The uniqueness of 
Shell’s GMoU unlike the CSR context Soobaroyen and Mahadeo allude to is that it is 
a self-imposed CSR initiative with the rhetoric of promoting community involvement. 
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